

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2665

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG

SUBJECT: NPG-DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY

REF: A. USNATO 2586

B. USNATO 2522

C. USNATO 2336

D. STATE 88710(1974)

E. STATE 102072

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION COMMENTS ON THE REVISED DRAFT NPG PERREPS REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY PROGRAM TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON IN REF A. ONE QUESTION OF THE APPROACH TO PHASE III, MISSION NBELIEVES THAT US SHOLD SUPPORT A BROAD APPROACH INVOLVING PREPARATION OF COMPREHENSIVE "POLITICAL GUIDELINES" FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT THAT WE SHOULD DECIDE IN ADVANCE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE WANT SUCH AN EFFORT TO GO, AS SUGGESTED IN PARA

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BELOW. END SUMMARY.

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1. PRINCIPLE ISSUE AT HAND IS HANDLING OF SECTION IV OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT (RE F A) ON INITITATION OF PHASE III (PREPARATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE). AS REPORTED IN REF B, ALL NPG COUNTRIES EXCEPT US FAVOR TAKING BROAD APPROACH TO PHASEIII AND PREPARING COMPRE-

HENSIVE CONCEPT FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF WE WISH TO GO ALONG WITH THIS APPROACH (AND AT THIS POINT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT NOT TO DO SO, AND EXERCISE THE LEADERSHIP WE SHOULD, WE MUST MOVE SOON.

2. WE SEE SEVERAL ALLIED MOTIVATIONS IN FAVORING A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III. FIRST, THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH EFFORTS AS THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, THE NUNN AMENDMENT, AND THE FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY PROGRAM, AS WELL AS CURRENT AGREED POLICY ON INITIAL USE, ROLE OF THEATER STRIKE FORCES, ETC., SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS. SECOND, THE DIFFICULT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH AROSE DURING OPC/MC PLAN IN WINTEX -75 LEFT A GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT NATO NEEDS A CLEARER OVERALL UNDERSTANDING OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIRD, THE ALLIES PROBABLY SENSE IN A GENERAL WAY THAT A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH A GREATER VOICE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY IN THIS IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE AREA.

3. FROM US PERSPECTIVE, MISSION BELIEVES THAT KEY FACTOR IN CONSIDERING A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III IS EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAVE A CLEAR AND AGREED VIEW OF THE DIRECTION WE FAVOR SO THAT WE CAN GUIDE SUCH AN EFFORT IN WAYS THAT SERVE OUR INTERESTS. WE WOULD RECOMMEND A BROAD APPROACH PROVIDING MAXIMUM SCOPE FOR THE US TO EXTEND INTO NATO DOCTRINE THE US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY APPROVED IN 1974, AND TO FRAME A ROLE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONSISTENT WITH EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE, THAT COMPLEMENTS OUR OBJECTIVES IN THIS YEAR'S MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. IN OUR DISCUSSION HERE, ALLIED REPS HAVE FREQUENTLY RECALLED STATEMENTS BY US AUTHORITIES THAT NATO NEEDS TO DEVELOP A CONVINCING RATIONALE FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT AS TO WHY THE US HAS NOT SHOWN ENTHUSIASM FOR PRACTICING WHAT IT HAS PREACHED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

4. NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE, MISSION BELIEVES WE SHOULD HAVE CLEARLY IN MIND THAT PREPARATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT  
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FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD HAVE ITS DRAWBACKS. OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES GENERALLY PREFER TO CONTEMPLATE THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ESSENTIALLY IN TERMS OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE AND TO ACHIEVING "POLITICAL OBJECTIVES;" THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN COMING TO SERIOUS GRIPS WITH THE UNDERLYING NEED FOR NATO TO PLAN FOR THE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE, IN UNDERTAKING A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III, WE WOULD NEED TO GUARD AGAINST ANY TENDENCY TO LIMIT APPROPRIATE FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, OR TO CONSTRAIN UNDULY US OPTIONS. THESE DIFFICULTIES, OF COURSE, WOULD APPLY TO ANY APPROACH TO PHASE III, BUT THEY PROBABLY WOULD BE ACCENTUATED IN A BROAD APPROACH. FURTHER, TO AVOID IMPLICATION THAT THE NPG WOULD BE DELVING INTO DETAILED AREAS THAT FALL UNDER THE PRUVIEW OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, MISSION BELIEVES WE SHOULD CHARACTERIZE SUCH

A BROAD APPROACH AS INVOLVING THE PREPARATION OF COMPREHENSIVE  
"POLITICA GUIDELINES" FOR THE USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT AN APPROACH TO PHASE III INVOLVING  
PREPARATION OF COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL GUIDELINES COULD HAVE USEFUL  
EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT IN THE ALLIANCE, AND COULD PROVIDE MAXIMUM  
SCOPE TO FOSTER US OBJECTIVES. WE CAUTION, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD  
HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE DIRECTION WE WOULD WANT SUCH AN EFFORT  
TO GO AND RECOGNIZE, AS VISSION STATEE IN REF C, THAT IT WOULD  
REQUIRE CAREFUL MANAGEMENT AND STRONG US PARTICIPATION.

6. AS FOR THE OTHERS PARTS OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT, PARTICULARLY  
SECTION III, WHICH DISCUSSES THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PHASE II  
STUDY TEAM REPORT, A GOOD DEAL OF EDITORIAL WORKK IIS REQUIRED. THESE  
DIFFICULTIES ARE READILY APPARENT, AND DO NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC  
MENTION IN THIS MESSAGE. THE FOLLOWING ARE SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON  
THE DRAFT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NATO 2665

A) PARA 7: THIS PARAGRAPH ADDS SOME USEFUL THOUGHTS ON  
LIMITATIONS OF PHASE I STUDIES. HOWEVER, THE POINT OF "UNFAVORABLE  
ASSUMPTIONS" IS WEAK, IN THAT SUCH ASSUMPTIONS WERE NOT PARTICULARLY  
IMPORTANT FOR NATO'S DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT RATHER  
FOR THE RESULTS OF THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGES PORTRAYED IN SOME PHASE I  
STUDIES. THE ALLIES HAVE MADE MUCH OF THE GENERAL CONCLUSION IN  
PARA 63 OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT THAT NATO ENDS UP IN A  
RELATIVELY WORSE DITUATION FOLLOWING AN EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS, TO BLUNT TENDENCIES TO TAKE A DOGMATIC VIEW OF THIS CONCLUSION, WHICH COULD BE DAMAGING TO THE DETERRENT, MISSION BELIEVES WE SHOULD INCORPORATE LANGUAGE, IN PARA 7 OR ELSEWHERE WHICH POINTS UP THE LARGE NUMBER OF THE VARIABLES THAT COULD AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGES. SOME OF THE THOUGHTS CONTAINED IN REF D ARE RELEVANT IN THIS REPORT.

B) PARAS 8-10: MISSION BELIEVES PARAS 8-10 SHOULD BE RECAST TO ADDRESS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES (RETINING MOST OF THE THOUGHTS IN PARA 8, WHICH ARE GOOD) AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S USE AND  
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THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE ENEMY TO CONTINUE HIS AGGRESSION. THE REPORT SHOULD RETAIN, INTER ALI. THE POINT ABOUT POSSIBLE TARGETING OF RESERVE, AND SHOULD COMMENT ON THE NEED FOR NATO TO CONSIDER NUCLEAR USES WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPEDE THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO ADVANCE, THUS CAUSING THE WP TO REASSESS THE RISKS AND PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS IN CONTINUING AGGRESSION, EITHER CONVENTIONALLY, OR IN COMBINATION WITH NUCLEAR STRIKES. THE REPORT SHOULD NOT THAT SUCH CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO BOTH INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE.

C) PARA 13: ALTHOUGH WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN REF E PROPOSED DELETING MENTION OF "LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS", WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SELL IN VIEW OF THE ATTENTION THE US HAS GIVEN TO THIS SUBJECT IN NATO. THE WORDING OF PARA 13 CAN BE IMPROVED, BUT MISSION RECOMMENDS THAT WE SUPPORT INCLUSION OF THESE THOUGHTS IN THE PERMREPS REPORT.

D) PARA 14: WE BELIEVE THE DISCUSSION OF "MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS" IS INADEQUATE. WE SHOULD INCORPORATE LANGUAGE WHICH, IN GENERAL TERMS, CALLS ATTENTION TO VARIOUS FACTORS WHICH COULD BEAR ON RELATIVE CAPABILITIES THAT AFFECT MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS: E.G., QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF WEAPONRY; TARGET ACQUISITION CAPABILITIES; SURVIVABILITY; EFFECTIVE PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR STRIKES AND COMBINED CONVENTIONAL/NUCLEAR OPERATIONS; ECT.

E) PARA 20: THIS PARAGRAPH STILL RETAINS LANGUAGE ON THE QUESTIONABILITY OF "GRADUATED SUCCESSIVE LOW SCALE USES". MISSION AGREES WITH WASHINGTON COMMENTS IN PARA 27, REF E ON THIS POINT. WE WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO REMOVE FROM THE REPORT THE ABOVE LANGUAGE, WHICH SETS UP AN INAPPROPRIATE STRAWMAN, AND TO REFINE FURTHER THE PARAGRAPH ALONG THE LINES INDICATED IN REF E, INCLUDING INCORPORATION OF THE GENERAL IDEAS OF RESTRAINT COUPLED WITH MILITARILY EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REFLECTED IN US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY.  
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